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Abstract
This paper offers an empirical account of the engagement and success of nonprofits 
in contracting for elderly care in China and the Netherlands as two contrasting con-
texts. While contracting as an innovation demonstrates a state-centered approach in 
China, its Dutch counterpart has sought a balance between state and professional 
influences. The paper argues that public sector reforms, civil society development 
and social regulation support schemes contextualize the engagement and success 
of nonprofits in contracting for elderly care. Surveys among the managers of 176 
elderly care organizations in Shanghai and 70 elderly care organizations in the Neth-
erlands shows that the fundamental elements of nonprofit contracting in elderly care 
are strikingly similar between both contexts, although their manifestation is shaped 
by each specific institutional context.
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Introduction
Demographic change is an important challenge for many countries across the 
globe. Especially an ageing population has become a major concern for govern-
ments all over the globe. Given the prevalence of the population of elderly, and 
limited capacities of the younger generation to provide informal care, govern-
ments feel an urgent need for new structures to govern the provision of elderly 
care. Driven by forces of globalization, New Public Management (NPM) arose 
as an external pressure for reform. While NPM assumes that market forces will 
stimulate quality in service delivery and the development of innovations (Hood, 
1991), New Public Governance (NPG) approaches stress the importance of col-
laboration for service delivery and innovation—pooling of resources in trusted 
and interdependent contexts (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Osborne, 2006; Knut-
sen, 2017; Pen & Liang, 2019). Countries that face a strong pressure on elderly 
service delivery developed public innovations from a collaborative perspective. 
A particular public innovation is the development of nonprofit contracting and 
partnerships between local governments and the providers of elderly care (Brown 
& Potoski, 2004; Van Slyke, 2006). Often these partnerships are embedded in 
larger collaborative networks of government, nonprofits, and private organiza-
tions (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Jing, 2018).
Local nonprofit partnerships in elderly care, however, are embedded in politi-
cal–administrative, social and cultural contexts that may vary substantially across 
the globe. Context matters a lot for the success of public innovations. What 
works (and is appropriate) in one context may not be working in another context 
(Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Contexts can be characterized in terms of their politi-
cal–administrative system, such as: concentration of power, administrative capac-
ity, or level of (de)centralization (Meier, Rutherford & Avellaneda, 2017; Pollitt 
& Bouckaert, 2017). Contexts in the field of social entrepreneurship include char-
acteristics of culture (e.g., religiosity and tradition), socio-economic characteris-
tics, and domain-specific characteristics (Chandra & Kerlin, 2020).
In the present article, we focus on political–administrative characteristics of 
the context. Although we know that such characteristics matter for successful 
public management, our knowledge about the strength and mechanisms of con-
textual effects is still in its infancy (cf. Meier, Rutherford & Avellaneda, 2017). 
There is a clear need for comparative public management research that explores 
how our explanatory frameworks operate differently in different contexts. Com-
petitive contracting and partnerships between governments and nonprofits have 
been extensively studied in the field of public management—primarily in US 
and European contexts. Chandra and Kerlin (2020) contend that the majority of 
published social entrepreneurship research has a North American or European 
orientation.
We address these concerns by focusing on local contracting and partnerships 
in the provision of elderly care in two contexts: China and the Netherlands. By 
comparing these two systems, we employ a “diverse-case design” (Seawright & 
Gerring, 2008). On the one hand, these contexts face similar challenges and have 
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come with a similar public innovation. On the other hand, these two contexts vary 
widely in their political–administrative and socio-cultural characteristics, making 
them a unique testing ground for exploring commonalities and differences in our 
causal explanations (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 300; Choi, Berry & Ghadimi, 
2020).
We had the opportunity to employ a study among elderly care nonprofit manag-
ers in the contexts we have access to: China and the Netherlands. Both countries 
face a similar challenge of ageing society. Both in China and the Netherlands, 
elderly care is provided in hybrid modes of governance (Wong, 1994; 2008) in 
which local government contracting is key in establishing collaborative relations. 
China and the Netherlands introduced public–nonprofit partnerships (PNPs) in 
the provision of elderly care. The partnerships predominantly operate on the basis 
of local government contracting, stressing hybridity between a hierarchical and a 
market approach.
While the challenges and innovations in China and the Netherlands are quite 
comparable, the contexts differ widely. Contracting as an innovation demonstrates 
a state-centered approach in China, whereas its Dutch counterpart sought a bal-
ance between state and professional influences. In China, the introduction of con-
tracting aimed to stimulate efficiency and quality in the provision of elderly care. 
Previous government–nonprofit relations were embedded in administrative hierar-
chies and blamed as causes of nonprofit incapacities. A market-driven contracting 
approach was expected to provide nonprofit organizations with more autonomy as 
well as competition pressures, so they would perform better outside the realms of 
traditional, close-knit trust networks of officials (Jing & Chen, 2012). In the Nether-
lands, contracting between local governments and nonprofits established after a vast 
decentralization effort. Contracting empowered local governments with the author-
ity to pressure nonprofits to deliver more efficient and higher quality services. At 
the same time, this decentralization was thought to provide Dutch organizations in 
elderly care with the flexibility to better tailor their services to client demands, con-
tributing to client satisfaction and efficiency.
The present paper aims to study how these two contexts have shaped the drivers, 
benefits, success-factors, and scope of nonprofit organizations’ partnerships with 
local governments in the provision of elderly care. To compare the partnerships, 
we depart from a common framework of nonprofit engagement in contracting and 
partnerships derived from contracting theory (Brown & Potoski, 2004; Van Slyke, 
2006). The main research question of the present article is twofold: (1) what are the 
perceived drivers, benefits, success-factors, and scope of partnerships in elderly care 
contracting in China and the Netherlands? (2) If we observe commonalities and dif-
ferences, how can we explain them from the combination of theoretical insights in 
local service contracting and idiosyncratic characteristics of the two contexts?
Data for this comparative study are drawn from two surveys that conceptualize 
and operationalize the theoretical framework. In China, a survey was held among 
the leaders of nonprofit organizations in the Shanghai Municipality, a province of 
China. Most of these organizations provide, among others, elderly care (n = 176 in 
sample). In the Netherlands a survey was held among the managers of organizations 
for elderly care (n = 70 in sample). The surveys include contextualized questions 
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about factors that promote or hinder success in contractual management and partner-
ships with local government in the provision of services.
Local contracting and partnerships in China and the Netherlands
In order to understand how the two contexts shape the drivers, benefits, success-
factors, and scope of nonprofit organizations’ partnerships in China and the Neth-
erlands we first provide a thick description of the two institutional contexts. We 
structure our description along four characteristics of the institutional context: state 
intervention in elderly care, public sector reforms, civil society development, and 
social regulation and support (cf. Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004).
State intervention in elderly care
China In the contexts of the rapid population ageing, long-term care of the elderly 
population has become a pending concern for governments all over the globe. Long-
term care practices are often deeply ingrained in old traditions and societal values. A 
good example of this is the filial piety tradition that views family as the main care-
taker for the frail elderly. This century-long tradition is affirmed in the Chinese Con-
stitution, stating that ‘Children who have become of age have the duty to support and 
assist their parents’ (Wu, Carter, Goins & Cheng, 2005, p. 37). Encouraging a strong 
role of the family is an inherent policy practice in Chinese urban cities. In Shanghai, 
the most aged society in China, the so called “90-7-3 framework” was proposed in 
2007, aiming to divide the elderly into three groups based on their need for care: 
90% of elderly are expected to rely on family care giving, 7% on community-based 
services and 3% on institutional care (Chen & Han, 2016). Nonetheless, in China the 
state has been taking more responsibilities for elderly care since the new century, due 
to various reasons such as the increasing public sector wealth, the pursuit of a “har-
monious society”, and the unprecedented aging that was partially caused by decade-
long one-child policy. Although government’s social and public service spending has 
increased fast in the last two decades, adequate provision of elderly services still faces 
serious barriers.
Netherlands In contrast to China, both the income protection (basic old age pen-
sion) and long-term care of the elderly have been long a responsibility of the Dutch 
governments. OECD data show that around 20% of people aged 65 or older were in 
receipt of either home care (13%) or residential care services (7%), being one of the 
highest proportions in the OECD countries in 2006 (Da Roit, 2013). Both residential 
and non-residential care remain to be largely publicly funded in the Netherlands and 
private financing comprises only a small part of the total expenditure (8% in 2012, 
comprising small income-related co-payments, see: Maarse & Jeurissen, 2016, p. 
242). Public financing, predominantly through social insurance contributions and 
taxes, is commonly combined with service delivery through nonprofit care providers.
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Public sector reforms
China In the 1980s both China and the Netherlands started to shift to collaborative 
service delivery, due to the international influence of NPM and domestic service pres-
sures. Government agencies themselves have been downsized during China’s mar-
ketization reforms, lacking in-house production capacities (Jing, 2008). Meanwhile, 
the profit-driven market hardly produced affordable services while government-
sponsored public service units and nonprofit organizations were not professional and 
capable enough to respond to new elderly service demands. In China, cross-sector 
collaboration was justified by claims of higher service efficiency and quality and 
pushed forward by government downsizing. Private organizations were first allowed 
to invest in public utilities and infrastructures through collaborative arrangements, 
and later to contract with government on services like information system, building 
maintenance, and logistical management. The Government Procurement Law was 
enacted in 2002, legitimating the procurement of services. The fast-growing demands 
on social services forced Chinese governments to move forward to seek new and 
capable social service partners. Informal social service contracting got widespread 
in the 1990s, mostly between government agencies and the nonprofit organizations 
that they supervised. Yet, growing requirements for transparency, competition and 
accountability in China’s public sector have forged a shift toward market-oriented 
formal and competitive contracting since the late 1990s. Contracting as an innovation 
not just aimed at expanded and improved services, but also at reformed government–
nonprofit relations that offered nonprofits more autonomy and external opportunities.
Encouraging nonprofit development has gradually become a formal strategy 
and a national policy for Chinese government to handle its social service capacity 
deficits. Professional social service organizations are allowed to deliver services to 
the elderly based on government contracts or by charging user fees. There are two 
paths for nonprofit development: one is to allow new nonprofit organizations that are 
driven by new service demands to emerge and grow; another is to reshape existing 
nonprofit organizations by making them more professional, autonomous and com-
petitive. These pragmatic changes could only occur gradually in China’s social gov-
ernance system with a traditional emphasis on strict social control, through which 
governments manage key legitimacy and financial resources available to nonprofit 
organizations and oversee their operation. China’s nonprofit organization policy has 
been moving ahead only slowly under the tensions between its twin goals of non-
profit development and control (Jing, 2015). Both governments and nonprofits have 
been cautiously exploring new opportunities offered by contracting.
Contracting has got widespread support from nonprofits in China. A survey 
of Shanghai nonprofits in 2010 (Jing, 2018) shows that 69% of the 104 respond-
ing nonprofits believed that contracting is a better way compared to direct appro-
priation from government. The present 2016 survey also shows that 96% of the 176 
nonprofits are willing to have more contracts. Increasing government social service 
expenditures and changing financing mechanisms have imposed serious pressures 
on nonprofits whose professional development was only nascent. The service mar-
ket created by government demands has become a major source of professionaliza-
tion and modernization of nonprofits in China. Currently, nonprofit organizations 
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in China have been engaged in the provision of long-term services for the elderly 
(Van Gerven, 2019b). In the past, the collaborative networks in elderly services were 
largely informal and heavily reliant on flexible negotiations and trust, blurring the 
boundaries between governments and nonprofits. These informal networks were 
seen to lead to various problems, such as decoupling, nepotism, lacking autonomy 
and motivation (Jing & Chen, 2012). While competitive contracting is seen as the 
answer, earlier work on the topic shows this element still to be weak in China (Jing 
& Chen, 2012). Other related institutional reforms are needed to make this market 
approach work.
Netherlands In the context of population ageing and public austerity, Dutch govern-
ments in the last decades increased the use of market mechanisms in its long-term 
care system. Subsequent Dutch welfare reforms demonstrated a change towards indi-
vidual responsibility and individual choice, indicating a broader shift from a ‘welfare 
state’ to a ‘welfare or participatory society’ (Van Gerven, 2019a). Similar to China, 
in the Netherlands family and community support have become more prominent in 
delivering long-term care for the elderly. The long-term care today in the Netherlands 
is a field of integrated provisions of institutional and home-care services, with a spe-
cial focus on autonomy and empowerment of users (clients) and providers. Tailor-
made solutions are provided by local public and social networks.
Contracting in the Netherlands is the logical continuation of care provision in 
civil society networks—operating in hybrid quasi-markets (Bies, 2010). Although 
government is the central initiating actor, it is not strongly involved in these partner-
ships. While performance measures and quality control are inherent part of the pub-
lic service delivery in the Netherlands, the partnership in elderly care follows a logic 
that is closer to NPG than to NPM.
Civil society development
China Civil society development in China and the Netherlands followed different 
paths, which fundamentally determined the values and qualifications of the nonprofit 
sector. Civil society, in its modern sense, only began to emerge since China’s reform 
and opening up in the late 1970s. Following the gradual state retreat from omnipotent 
social control, a corporatist social regime emerged since the 1980s in response to the 
new demands and conflicts from a more diverse and freer society. Social organiza-
tions could be established legally by registering themselves at a civil affairs agency 
if they can first have a government agency as their business supervisor. While both 
requirements aimed at control, they did offer a formal channel of social organization 
development and led to quick growth of the nonprofits, showing a Chinese version 
of “voluntary revolution”.1 Still, the sector has been small and weak. In recent years, 
1 For example, in 2003 there were 266,612 registered social organizations in China, including 141,167 
social groups, 124,491 nonprofit enterprises, and 954 foundations. In the end of 2017, there were 
762,000 registered social organizations, including 355,000 social groups, 400,000 nonprofit enterprises, 
and 6307 foundations.
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local governments have made pilot tests to allow nonprofits in areas like social ser-
vice and welfare to get directly registered without having a supervisory agency.
The state–society relation in China has been changing slowly under a general 
framework of selective empowerment and control (Jing, 2015) in which contracting 
appeared and evolved. Nonprofit organizations, while getting more space in organi-
zational development, are also taking new political obligations like party building. 
Such an institutional structure tends to induce a pragmatic nonprofit entrepreneur-
ship while avoiding rivalry between governments and nonprofits. Contracting is a 
“managed social innovation” (Jing & Gong, 2012) adopted by government to shape 
the nonprofit sector. Besides the pursuit of professional development, contracting 
nonprofits are aware of political expectations underlying financial transactions.
Netherlands A well-organized civil society has been the main feature of social wel-
fare and care provision in the Netherlands for decades. In the provision of long-term 
care in the Netherlands well-organized civil society organizations have already, for 
decades, shared a responsibility for policy making and service delivery with the state. 
The “societal midfield”—as the civil society in the Dutch context is often referred 
to—is defined by the intermediary position of organizations between the individual 
citizen and the state (Dekker, Völker, Lelieveldt & Torenvlied, 2010; Brandsen & 
Pope, 2015). This was rooted in Dutch pillarization: the accommodation of a diver-
sity of nonprofit organizations with specific religious and social backgrounds in spec-
ified policy fields (Brandsen & Pope, 2015).
Reminiscent of the pillarization, civil society has been deeply engaged in the pro-
vision of public services and granted quite some professional autonomy to nonprofit 
organizations. However, concerns about the quality of public service provision, as 
well as Anglo-Saxon influences on Dutch national policymaking, introduced strong 
elements of NPM in the operation of civil society. Although civil society organiza-
tions gained a larger share of managerial autonomy, they also became subjected to 
a regime of stronger performance measures, quality control, as well as obligations 
to collaborate with other organizations (Bies, 2010; Brandsen & Pope, 2015). Like 
in China, contracting in the Netherlands is a type of “managed social innovation” 
that Jing & Gong (2012) observe. Government bears the main responsibility for the 
provision of services but has deliberately chosen to empower the nonprofit sector 
to take up the role of service delivery without strong state intervention. Similar to 
China also in the Netherlands the pursuit of professional development comes with 
an awareness by contracting nonprofits of the political expectations that underlying 
the financial transactions.
Social regulation and support scheme
China The prior organizational environments of nonprofits significantly influence 
how they partner with other organizations in service delivery, determining their 
capacity of contracting. The social regulation and support schemes in China and the 
Netherlands are different. China’s social regulation/support system, embedded in 
urban grassroots, is characterized by a close coordination between grassroots govern-
ments (GGs) and Urban Residents’ Committees (URCs) that GGs supervise (Read, 
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2000). Nonprofit organizations first emerged to deliver services as a complement to 
this system in need of extra capacities. As they were usually organizationally affili-
ated to the local governments of their service areas, it was easy for them to obtain 
support from the GG–URC network. For nonprofits coming into a new community 
due to contracting, a major issue is to familiarize themselves with GGs and URCs 
so their service delivery will get the necessary permits and support. For example, 
residents may not open their doors to nonprofit workers unless they are accompanied 
by URC staff.
The regulation-support structure essentially shapes the service networks of Chi-
nese nonprofits. While they may partner with other nonprofits, and even with pri-
vate organizations, for operational and professional resources they have to work with 
state and quasi-state organizations to overcome legitimacy and regulatory barriers. 
Nonprofits may have to sacrifice organizational autonomy in exchange for a closer 
relation with governments beyond financial concerns. As was mentioned before, 
these nonprofits improve their brands and reputation by having good working rela-
tions with governments. Nonprofit leaders themselves may also be “coopted” by tak-
ing membership in representative state institutions like People’s Congress.
Netherlands In the Netherlands the most important organizational environment for 
nonprofits in elderly care has been the social insurance system, which provides a 
state-guaranteed financial support system for the elderly. The long-term care is pro-
vided through an obligatory health care insurance system that covers both costs of 
institutional care as well as of home care. The indication of care is provided by a 
regional authority in the form of a central independent agency (“Centrum Indicaties-
telling Zorg”) that assesses both the need of care as well as the type and volume of 
the care provided. The elderly receive in-kind care or can opt-out for cash benefits in 
purchasing services. While market mechanisms prevail for purchased care, in-kind 
care is organized by 32 regional purchasing agencies (“Zorgkantoren”). Government 
sets tariffs and price gaps for care, on which nonprofits may compete.
A major overhaul of long-term care as of 2016 manifested in a considerable shift 
from residential care to non-residential (home) care, which empowered the social 
responsibilities of society in the provision of elderly care alongside a rigid imple-
mentation of austerity measures (Maarse & Jeurisse, 2016). The introduction of 
a more hybrid and market-oriented regulatory framework diversified elderly care, 
adjusted to the specific needs of the elderly. The transaction costs for introducing 
this system lie within partnerships of health care nonprofits, public and private 
organizations, and client organizations. The real costs for the elderly themselves 
lie in a transfer from the state (that used to organize sole in-kind services and resi-
dential care) towards diverse nonprofit organizations providing professionalized 
elderly care, asking value for money, and collaborating with other nonprofits to 
meet individualized needs and demands in the home environment. This is a major 
transformation witnessed in the Netherlands. The greater autonomy of nonprofits for 
elderly care, and their inclusion in broader civil society partnerships, increased the 
legitimacy of this transformation. External legitimacy, through professionalization 
and innovation, is essential when moving from a public elderly care (with elderly 
nonprofits as a terminal station) towards a networked professional support system 
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tailored to the needs of individual elderly. The partnership networks we explored are 
quintessential for making that transformation a success in the future—both in China 
and the Netherlands.
Framework for nonprofit engagement in contracting and partnerships
Competitive contracting and partnerships between governments and nonprofits have 
been extensively studied in the field of public management (cf. Eikenberry & Klu-
ver, 2004). Models depart from transaction cost theory: when the agency costs of 
in-house service production exceed the transaction costs of partner search, contract-
ing and monitoring, then it pays off to outsource the service (cf. Brown & Potoski, 
2004). NPM postulates that market competition, as a driving force, combines with 
government expectations and professional development into more efficient, flexible, 
and high-quality service provisions. While most scholarly attention is paid to the 
outsourcing perspective, it remains understudied why nonprofits would participate 
in partnerships. Below in Fig. 1 we present a framework for nonprofit engagement 
in contracting and partnerships that sheds more light on this question. The model 
has four elements: driving forces behind contracting, nonprofits’ perceived ben-
efits, determinants of success, and types and scope of local government–nonprofit 
partnerships.
Driving forces of nonprofit engagement in contracting (first element)
From the perspective of nonprofit organizations, the shift we observe towards col-
laborative service delivery, both in China and the Netherlands, is driven by domestic 
forces behind the logic of NPM—pushing for a legitimate involvement in contract-
ing. The importance of these driving forces may vary between different nonprofits. 
We distinguish between three driving forces. In the first place, nonprofit organiza-
tions will be concerned with government’s demands and expectations when con-
tracting out their services (Savas, 2002; Brown & Potoski, 2004; Van Slyke, 2006). 
When contracting out is optimal given (high) levels of internal agency costs, con-
tracting will be based on the initiative of government itself. It requires government 
to adjust the (legal) institutions regulating the provision of elderly care to facilitate 
contracting out. The adapted institutions incentivize nonprofit providers of elderly 
care to engage in contracting, optimizing their chances for survival in a changing 
institutional environment.
In the second place, with the introduction of NPM-driven public sector reforms 
nonprofit organizations had to strategically turn to the market to obtain critical capi-
tal. NPM reforms usually tend to discourage close government–nonprofit ties; part-
nerships have to be tested and supported through market competition. Stable and 
direct financial support from government is reduced sharply under NPM reforms, 
forcing nonprofits to obtain market contracts by demonstrating their competence 
(Lee & Liu, 2012). These changing resource-dependences (Knutsen, 2017) stimu-
late nonprofits to adopt an entrepreneurial, risk-taking approach, which may result 
in improved service quality and efficiency, but also in more opportunistic behavior.
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In the third place, nonprofits may engage in contracting out from a need for pro-
fessional development (Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Van Den Bekerom, Torenvlied 
& Akkerman, 2016; Jing, 2018). Formal contracting, as a way to realize public func-
tions through partnerships, usually involves the extension of public rules and norms 
to new cross-sector partnership networks (Freeman, 2003). For example, the use of 
public money drives the transparency of, and public accountability for, contracting 
processes. Consequently, professionalism is both a precondition for, and a result of, 
contracting. In order to survive, nonprofits must adapt to the (developing) profes-
sional norms in the institutional environment of the voluntary sector—providing 
nonprofits with a partnered opportunity to further professionalize the organization’s 
service provision.
Propositions
Given the dominance of the NPM framework in both contexts, we expect that organ-
izations for elderly care perceive government demands and expectations to be more 
important than either of the two other driving forces. Both in China and the Neth-
erlands public/nonprofit contracting in elderly care was introduced by the govern-
ment to stimulate market conditions for service contracting in this sector. Because of 
the demographic changes that lie ahead, and a rising self-consciousness of nonprofit 
communities, we expect professional development to be an important driver as well. 
We expect that market competition, as the “purest” form of NPM is perceived to be 
the least important driver of nonprofit engagement in contracting in both contexts. 
The elderly service market itself is not highly developed in either context, although 
there is a trend towards personal investments by elderly in the Netherlands.
Perceived benefits of contracting (second element)
The driving forces of nonprofits’ engagement in partnerships are co-determined by 
the (instrumental) benefits of contracting. Contracting may also bring about various 
benefits, but also problems to nonprofits that they have to learn to balance (Mac-
Manus, 1991). A first benefit is access to resources. Organizations in elderly care 
must pool resources and organize their resource dependencies in order to provide 
high-quality care (Knutsen, 2017). The second benefit is the enhancement of the rep-
utation as a high-quality service provider that has been granted a contract (Schalk, 
Torenvlied & Allen, 2010). Surviving the procedures and standards for contracting 
signal a reputation, that is: inclusion in a preferred set of service providers by local 
government. The third benefit is that contracting provides elderly organizations with 
the potential to further professionalize their staff, improving conditions for effec-
tive internal management of the organization. A fourth benefit is that contracting 
helps elderly organizations to buffer for instabilities and disruptions in the environ-
ment through effective network building (Van Den Bekerom, Torenvlied & Akker-
man, 2016). A final benefit of contracting is more autonomy in service provision, 
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Propositions
In both contexts, we expect access to resources to be a major perceived benefit. 
Due to the shift towards a market-based financing scheme, contracting became the 
mainstream source of financial revenues for nonprofits. Providers of elderly care in 
both contexts must learn how to obtain (and maintain) contracts in order to stabilize 
their revenues. Other benefits may be perceived to be important in varying degree. 
For example, whereas financial diversification may bring about more autonomy for 
Dutch nonprofits, non-financial control from Chinese government may make auton-
omy less visible in that context.
Determinants of contracting success (third element)
The driving forces of nonprofits engagement in partnerships also co-determine how 
nonprofits successfully obtain contracts from government. These factors are associ-
ated with the “ally principle” from a principal-agent theory, or the concept of “goal 
alignment” from stewardship theory (Van Slyke, 2006). Various factors may affect 
the legitimacy of the organization, such as its history and experience (past perfor-
mance) or prior trusted relationships with local governments and officials. Size of 
the organization signals a capacity to provide large-scale elderly care. Professional 
capacity signals the ability to provide high-quality elderly care. Other determinants 
are the (in)formal reputation in the domain and quality of organizational leadership.
Propositions
While all these determinants may influence the chance of nonprofits to obtain con-
tracts, we expect that in China prior history of service delivery and prior govern-
ment–nonprofit ties and trust are especially important. Service contracting in China 
is still in an early stage and the market is segmented with only few nonprofits availa-
ble for competition (Jing & Chen, 2012). Prior service activities and relations, there-
fore, serve as proxies for professional capacity and political trustfulness. By con-
trast, for Dutch elderly care we expect that professionalism is a strong determinant 
for success because of the stepwise introduction of contracting. Thus, in the Neth-
erlands the established reputation of nonprofit organizations will be more important 
than prior trusted relationships. Information about past performance reduces uncer-
tainty in contracting and, hence, transaction costs. In the more market-oriented con-
text of Dutch elderly care provision political trustfulness is expected to be much less 
important.
Scope of partnerships (fourth element)
The driving forces, perceived benefits and determinants of success affect the scope 
of the partnerships. What types of other organizations collaborate in the partner-
ships: governments, public service providers, private organizations, political 
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organizations, or other nonprofit organizations? Scope of the partnerships is asso-
ciated with ambitions and complexity (Akkerman & Torenvlied, 2011; Graddy & 
Chen, 2006).
Propositions
We expect substantial differences between China and the Netherlands as social ser-
vice networks in the two contexts may have very different starting points and evo-
lutionary paths. Chinese nonprofits have had a history of heavily relying on gov-
ernmental agencies and semi-official community organizations in service delivery. 
Recent practices of contracting and upgraded service delivery have invited or pushed 
them to expand their service networks to include more diverse types of organiza-
tions for professional and operational resources. By contrast, Dutch nonprofits have 
had a long history of nonprofit cooperation on a voluntary basis. Therefore, public 
organizations may play a role in their networks that may be far less critical than 
that in China’s context. Through its emphasis on cooperation in civil society over 
the years, Dutch elderly care organizations are expected to have more inclusive and 
broader networks of collaboration than their Chinese counterparts.
Design and method
To explore whether our propositions about contracting and local partnerships hold, 
we surveyed how elderly care organizations in China and in the Netherlands perceive 
themselves in their contracting practices. We sent surveys to managers of elderly 
care organizations in both contexts. We decided to choose the Shanghai municipal-
ity and the Netherlands as a country as our frameworks for sampling. We did so for 
two reasons. In the first place, both contexts are roughly comparable in population 
size. Shanghai has a population of 24.1 million in 2015, about seven million more 
than the Dutch population. Although Shanghai is not representative of China, its 
social practices, including nonprofit development such as nonprofit contracting, have 
long been best practices that inspired other Chinese cities. Consequently, we believe 
that a comparison of samples of organizations from Shanghai and the Netherlands 
is illuminating and can inform further studies. In the second place, we had access to 
survey elderly organizations in these contexts. The questions included in our surveys 
aimed to tap the importance assigned by these managers to the four elements of our 
framework model. We slightly adapted constructs in the surveys to accommodate to 
cultural and institutional characteristics of each context.
Data collection in the Shanghai Municipality
In June 2016, the Shanghai Community Service Center was invited to distribute 
questionnaires to a total of 300 social organizations located in all the 16 districts 
in Shanghai. This service center is a quasi-government agency supervised by the 
Bureau of Civil Affairs of Shanghai Municipality and a major provider of social 
service contracts in Shanghai. From the social organizations targeted, 250 nonprofit 
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leaders responded. Among them, 176 organizations provided elderly care service. 
These organizations are included in the analysis for the present study. Among the 
176 social organizations that provide elderly care, 83% are nonprofit enterprises; 
15.9% are social groups; and 1.1% are foundations. The average organizational 
size was 15 full-time staff, and average age was 6 years in 2016. Roughly 95% of 
them ever gained contracts from government in the past two years, and roughly 90% 
gained contracts through a competitive process.
Data collection in the Netherlands
Data collection in the Netherlands took place in October 2018. The questionnaire 
was designed to include relevant questions in the Shanghai survey, but there were 
also questions that reflected the contextual differences in the Netherlands. We sent 
an online questionnaire to 394 elderly care organizations. These organizations were 
approached in consultation with the confederation of Dutch elderly care organiza-
tions (ActiZ), which has a very high membership rate. In an e-mail to the members 
we referred to a Qualtrics link and invited managers of these elderly care organiza-
tions to participate in the survey. Managerial characteristics reveal that 61% of the 
70 organizations that responded have female heads; average experience in elderly 
care was 19 years; average organizational size was 105 in terms of employees and 
635 in terms of clients. Most elderly care organizations within the sample offer nurs-
ing home care (92%), institutional nursing care (87%) and home care (79%).
The online questionnaire was available from the beginning of October until the 
end of November 2018. The questionnaire took approximately 15 to 20 min to com-
plete. The first invitation to fill in the questionnaire resulted in 30 respondents who 
finalized the questionnaire. After sending a reminder, the total number of respond-
ents increased to 70. For some questions, missing values slightly drop the number 
of cases to a minimum of 61. The reason for the generally moderate response was 
probably a concurrent survey, sent by ActiZ to its members—of which we became 
aware later in the process.
Results
Driving forces behind nonprofit contracting (first element)
The importance of driving forces behind nonprofit contracting were measured by 
asking respondents to indicate the relative importance they attach to various items 
that tap professional development, government expectations and market competi-
tion. In the China survey nonprofit leaders were asked to evaluate general influences 
from “professional development”, “government expectations” and “market competi-
tion”. In the Dutch survey the drivers “professional development” and “government 
expectations” were broken down into several items. Importance varies between “1” 
(completely unimportant) to “10” (extremely important).
Table 1 shows a similarity in importance assigned by managers of elderly organi-
zations in both contexts to the drivers, which is in line with our propositions. In 
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both contexts, the managers of nonprofits in elderly care rank professional develop-
ment as the most important driver of contracting, followed by government demands 
and expectations and then market competition. Responses in both contexts show that 
nonprofits are more sensitive to the government nudge—as a driver of contracting in 
elderly care—than to market competition. This finding reminds us that contracting 
in fact happens in a quasi-market environment, embedded in thick public institu-
tions, despite the NPM argumentation supporting the reforms. When contracting, 
nonprofits have to be sophisticated in handling incentives and constraints set by the 
government and less driven by the market rationality of business operations. The 
quasi-market characteristics of elderly care provision in both contexts clearly require 
sophistication in handling relations with government, whereas market competition 
serves only as a partial legitimization.
Benefits of contracting (second element)
The second element in our framework, perceived benefits of contracting, were meas-
ured by asking respondents to indicate the relative importance they attach to spe-
cific benefits that contracting may have form them as put forward in our framework. 
Given the different institutional set-up in each context, we slightly adjusted these 
items in each questionnaire. Importance varies between “1” (completely unimpor-
tant) to “10” (extremely important). Table 2 summarizes the responses.
A comparison of the relative importance of perceived benefits attached by 
respondents in the two contexts shows that, as expected in our proposition, access 
Table 1  Driving forces of engagement in contracting
Shanghai elderly care organizations Mean SD
Professional development (N = 174) 9.07 1.28
Government demands and expectations (N = 175) 8.77 1.48
Market competition (N = 173) 8.57 1.95
Dutch elderly care organizations (N = 61) Mean SD
Professional development 5.92 1.32
 Quality improvement in service delivery 7.57 1.85
 Labor productivity improvement 5.39 2.69
 Cost reductions in service delivery 4.80 2.03
Government demands and expectations 4.58 0.91
 New services for current clients 5.44 2.62
 New services for new clients 5.21 2.46
 Existing services for current clients 5.03 2.10
 Pressure from regulations 3.74 2.39
 Pressure from local governments and insurers 3.49 2.37
Market competition 4.31 2.45
 Increase competitiveness 4.31 2.45
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to resources is the most important benefit of contracting. Table 2 shows that, in both 
contexts, professionalization is considered by respondents to be the second ranked 
benefit of contracting. In the ranking of the other items, we observe differences 
between the contexts. Autonomy is considered to be a relatively unimportant benefit 
of contracting by managers of Chinese nonprofits in elderly care, but also by Dutch 
managers. Clear differences between the two contexts also exist. While managers of 
Chinese nonprofits indicate benefits from reputation gain, this item is of least impor-
tance to the managers of Dutch elderly care providers. In China, this reputation may 
reflect the importance of the government-orientation, attachment to traditional val-
ues and the status quo.
Determinants of the success in getting contracts (third element)
After surveying the drivers and benefits of contracting engagement, we asked the 
managers of the nonprofit organizations in elderly care what determinants they per-
ceive to be important for obtaining contracts. Contracting usually involves a “make 
or buy” decision and the government may only contract out when contracting non-
profit outperforms its direct employees. Even if there is only a “buy” option, the 
government may select the best performer through a competitive bidding process. 
We asked respondents to evaluate six factors with a scale from 1 (completely unim-
portant) to 10 (extremely important). Table 3 presents the results.
The results reveal almost identical response patterns for the two contexts. Prior 
service experiences, strong professional capacities and strong organizational reputa-
tion are the three determinants deemed most important for successful contracting 
in both contexts. Apparently, these factors are believed to be the most efficient and 
reliable indicators of service competence in both contexts. Although we expected, in 
our proposition, differences in perceptions between the Dutch (professional capac-
ity most important) and Chinese managers (prior service activities and history most 
important), actually we observe not many qualitative differences.
Table 2  Benefits of contracting for elderly care organizations
Shanghai elderly care organizations (N = 176) Mean SD
Access to resources 8.84 1.74
Improve professional service ability 8.84 1.58
Strengthen reputation of organization 8.84 1.55
Build a better network with government agencies 8.63 1.74
Complete the tasks from supervisory governments 8.51 1.95
Dutch elderly care organizations (N = 66) Mean SD
Access to resources 5.36 2.84
Improve professional service ability 5.36 2.45
Strengthen collaboration 5.18 2.46
Increase autonomy 4.77 2.73
Strengthen reputation of organization 4.51 2.54
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Organizational size and leadership capability are both deemed as least important 
determinants for successful contracting by managers from both contexts. In China’s 
culture of collectivism, the nonprofit leaders may refrain from giving high scores 
when they evaluated this item during the survey. Prior relationships with govern-
ment are perceived to be of intermediate importance for managers from both con-
texts. These results may resonate respondents’ evaluation of the first element, 
ranking drivers of contracting in importance from professional development via 
government expectation to market competition.
Scope of partnership in the service networks (fourth element)
The final element in the explanatory framework for nonprofit engagement in con-
tracting and partnerships is the type and scope of the service networks in which the 
nonprofits for elderly care are involved. These service networks are shaped by the 
institutional environment that provides legitimacy and resources through contracting 
in service delivery. We measured the self-reported intensity of cooperation with sev-
eral types of organizations in the partnership network. For each context, we applied 
a specific approach when measuring cooperation with other organizations in service 
delivery. We therefore discuss results separately, starting with the Chinese context in 
Table 4.
In Shanghai, we asked the managers of nonprofits in elderly care to report the 
intensity of their cooperation with other organizations in service delivery (with “1” 
representing least intensive cooperation and “5” representing most intensive coop-
eration). We formulated the proposition that public organizations play a strong role 
in Chinese elderly service networks. The responses by the managers of elderly ser-
vice organizations reflect this proposition. Table 1 shows a declining intensity from 
Table 3  Factors determining the success of nonprofits in obtaining contracts
Shanghai elderly care organizations N Mean SD
History and experience of providing similar services 174 9.16 1.25
Strong professional capacities 174 9.13 1.29
Good social reputation 175 9.06 1.58
Prior cooperative and trusting relationships with the service 
demanding governments
175 8.80 1.79
Large size of the organization 174 7.45 2.15
Organizational leadership credibility and network 172 6.35 2.89
Dutch elderly care organizations N Mean SD
Prior client satisfaction 70 7.57 2.02
Strong reputation of the organization 70 7.34 1.68
Professional capacity 70 7.00 1.82
Prior relationships 70 6.73 2.28
Network and credible leadership 70 6.03 2.40
Size of the organization 70 5.53 2.33
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URCs, local government agencies, other social organizations, public service units, 
Party and other political and mass organizations, and—lastly—enterprises. This 
pattern reflects that most social service contracts are community-based in Shanghai 
and contracting nonprofits must collaborate with urban residence committees, being 
half-official and half-representational community self-governance organizations 
(SCNPC, 2018; Mok, 1988; Read, 2000). Urban residence committees offer non-
profits access to local households and provide local information and knowledge. The 
residence committees help coordinate complex issues and handle local disputes. In 
addition, contracting nonprofits must work closely with local government agencies 
in civil affairs, public security, public health, and education—monitoring and regu-
lating service delivery. Other social organizations are sought by contracting nonprof-
its for resource sharing. Least cooperation exists between nonprofits and enterprises.
In the Netherlands, service network composition was measured by asking the 
managers of nonprofits in elderly care to indicate the two most important partner-
ship networks they were engaged in. For each partnership network respondents 
were subsequently asked to tick (from a general list of partnership organizations) 
whether a specific organization is present in their partnership network (Torenvlied, 
Akkerman, Meier & O’Toole, 2013). The general list of partnership organizations 
comprised health care organizations, private organizations, public service provid-
ers, governments, nonprofits, politicians. The responses provide information about 
the composition of the partnership networks of respondents in terms of the general 
list of organizations. We pooled organizations over the two partnership networks, 
providing us with information about the intensity of networking by the nonprofits in 
elderly care with organizations from the six categories. A value of 0.63 in Table 5 
(mean score for health care organizations) reflects that in 63% of all Dutch nonprof-
its in elderly care their two most important partnership networks included at least 
one health care organization.
We formulated the proposition that public organizations are less prominent in the 
Dutch elderly service networks than in the Chinese. Table 5 shows that results are 
in line with our proposition. In the Netherlands: health care organizations (albeit 
nonprofits and hybrid organizations) are the most important network partners for 
nonprofits in elderly care—while government organizations are much less included 
Table 5  Intensity of partnerships in the service networks in the Netherlands (N = 70)
Type of partners Mean SD Partners description
Health care organizations 0.63 0.92 Rehabilitation centers, institutions for elderly care, hospitals, 
employee organizations in care
Private organizations 0.53 0.76 Advice bureaus, private organizations and business, product 
developers
Public service 0.20 0.60 Police, schools, knowledge institutions, housing corporations
Government 0.16 0.50 Municipal government, provincial government, national 
government
Nonprofits 0.09 0.28 Nonprofit organizations
Politicians 0.04 0.20 Political organizations
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as a partner. While in China nonprofits is elderly care collaborate least with private 
organizations, these organizations are second most involved in partnership networks 
for elderly care in the Netherlands. These results resonate the differences between 
institutional pathways in the two contexts, with Chinese nonprofits’ reliance on gov-
ernmental agencies and semi-official community organizations and Dutch nonprofits 
building on a long history of voluntary nonprofit cooperation.
Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we offered an empirical account of the engagement and success of 
nonprofits in contracting for elderly care in China and the Netherlands as two con-
trasting contexts. We presented a comparative analysis of the institutional con-
texts that shape nonprofit contracting and partnership. We focused on differences 
between China and the Netherlands in state intervention in elderly care, public sec-
tor reforms, civil society development, and social regulation and support. While 
contracting as an innovation demonstrates a state-centered approach in China, its 
Dutch counterpart has sought a balance between state and professional influences. 
We argued that the paths in institutional development in China and the Netherlands 
contextualize the engagement and success of nonprofits in contracting for elderly 
care. To analyze this engagement and success among nonprofit organizations in 
elderly care, we introduced a general framework that allowed us to empirically cap-
ture nonprofit managers in terms of: (1) their perception of the driving forces behind 
nonprofit contracting in elderly care; (2) their perceived benefits of contracting; (3) 
their experience about determinants of success, and (4) the structure of their partner-
ship networks.
Our first research question concerned these perceived drivers, benefits, success-
factors, and scope of partnerships in elderly care contracting in China and the Neth-
erlands. Both in China and the Netherlands contracting and partnership practices 
were driven by similar professionalization concerns and less by market pressures, 
despite the distinct pathways of public sector reform in both contexts. Although con-
tracting itself has all the associations with adopting a market orientation in public 
service delivery, the survey among the Dutch elderly nonprofits shows that com-
petition is least of their concerns. Similar to their Chinese counterparts, contract-
ing translates, foremost, in further professionalization and modernization. Thus, 
although both contexts exhibit distinct pathways towards contracting, these path-
ways have led to strikingly similar practices that are incongruent with the basic ten-
ets of NPM. Both in the Chinese and Dutch context market competition is perceived 
to be the least important driver by managers of elderly care nonprofits, while these 
managers have similar concerns with increasing the quality of elderly care under 
NPG-oriented partnerships.
The NPG orientation to the provision of elderly care in the (institutionally 
quite different) contexts of China and the Netherlands resonates in other strik-
ingly similar experiences of nonprofit managers from both contexts. In both 
contexts access to resources and professionalization are reported to be the most 
important benefits of contracting, rather than increased autonomy (cf. Knutsen, 
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2017). Furthermore, prior service experiences, strong professional capacities and 
organizational reputation are the three determinants deemed most important for 
successful contracting by nonprofit managers in elderly care from both contexts. 
Thus, while China and the Netherlands have unique pathways of public sector 
reforms, civil society development, and social regulation and support—with a 
distinct socio-economic system and culture—nonprofit contracting and part-
nership practices, nevertheless, are driven by quite similar forces that result in 
similar perceived benefits and determinants of success (cf. Eikenberry & Kluver, 
2004; Brown & Potoski, 2004).
Before we jump, too rapidly, to the conclusion that distinct state–society rela-
tions have shaped contracting and partnerships in elderly care (as a public inno-
vation) in a similar way, we do stress that idiosyncratic differences in state–soci-
ety relations also manifest themselves in nonprofit practices. This addresses our 
second research question about the influence of idiosyncratic characteristics of 
the two contexts. The observed differences in practices are shaped by distinct 
forms of civil society development in China and the Netherlands, as well as insti-
tutional differences in social regulation and support between the two contexts. 
Not surprisingly, we observe those differences primarily in the composition of 
the partnership networks for elderly care. In China, where state–society rela-
tions are hierarchical and transitional, grassroot organizations such as urban resi-
dence committees with government agencies and public service units are most 
important network partners. This is strikingly different in the Netherlands where 
civil society countered a one-sided market orientation, embedding health care 
organizations, client groups and private organizations in partnership networks for 
elderly care.
Our study shows that, while globalization made NPM a common external pres-
sure of reform, public innovations in elderly service delivery to address an ageing 
population in China and the Netherlands exhibit very similar experiences and prac-
tices of NPG. This is an important observation for scholars in comparative public 
management. Context matters for the specific manifestation of managerial practices 
of nonprofits (cf. Chandra & Kerlin, 2020), but the fundamental public management 
drivers of these practices (Brown & Potoski, 2004; Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Van 
Slyke, 2006; Jing, 2018) are strikingly universal across the very different contexts of 
China and the Netherlands.
Although the self-reported responses are strictly perceptual, our surveys provide 
a first and important step towards understanding contracting and public–nonprofit 
partnership practices in different contexts—thus enabling further studies to test 
hypotheses in more detail. Further research should also include more institutional 
contexts, especially contexts that adopted a stronger market-driven approach than 
either China or the Netherlands (cf. Choi, Berry & Ghadimi, 2020). Further research 
would also need to include more in-depth studies of practices, aiming to learn from 
the specific mechanisms that drive best practices in specific contexts. The results of 
the present study show that we observe similar experiences in quite different con-
texts. Given the urgent challenge of an ageing population across the globe, this may 
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